11th RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

LINEAGE
11th Observation Squadron (Medium) constituted, 5 Feb 1942
Activated, 2 Mar 1942
Redesignated 11th Observation Squadron, 4 Jul 1942
Redesignated 11th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter), 2 Apr 1943
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 11 Aug 1943
Redesignated 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photographic, 25 Jan 1946
Inactivated, 31 Mar 1946
Activated, 19 May 1947
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Night Photographic, 14 Jun 1948
Inactivated, 28 Mar 1949
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 12 Aug 1953
Activated, 18 Sep 1953
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Electronics and Weather, 25 Nov 1953
Discontinued and inactivated, 8 Mar 1960
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo-Jet and activated, 3 Nov 1965
Organized, 1 Apr 1966
Redesignated 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 1 Oct 1966
Inactivated, 24 Jan 1971
Redesignated 11th Tactical Drone Squadron, 18 May 1971
Activated, 1 Jul 1971
Inactivated, 1 Apr 1979
Redesignated 11th Tactical Intelligence Squadron, 26 Jun 1991
Activated, 15 Jul 1991
Redesignated 11th Air Intelligence Squadron, 27 Jan 1992
Inactivated, 1 Jul 1994
Redesignated 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 1 Jul 1995
Activated, 29 Jul 1995

STATIONS
Wheeler-Sack Field, NY, 2 Mar 1942
DeRidder, LA, 6 May 1942
Esler Field, LA, 15 Dec 1942
Desert Center, CA, 29 Dec 1942
Morris Field, NC, 24 Sep 1943
Camp Campbell AAFld, KY, 6 Nov 1943
Pounds Field, TX, 17 Apr 1944
Lafayette Aprt, LA, 12 Jul 1944
Stuttgart AAFld, AR, 7 Feb 1945
Brooks Field, TX, 8 Dec 1945
Shaw Field, SC, 27 Feb-31 Mar 1946
Langley Field, VA, 19 May 1947
March Field, CA, 1 Sep 1947-28 Mar 1949
Kimpo AB, South Korea, 18 Sep 1953
Itami AB, Japan, 7 Dec 1954
Yokota AB, Japan, 15 Jul 1957- 8 Mar 1960
Mountain Home AFB, ID, 1 Apr-25 Oct 1966
Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, 25 Oct 1966-5 Nov 1970
Shaw AFB, SC, 10 Nov 1970-24 Jan 1971
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, 1 Jul 1971-1 Apr 1979
Elmendorf AFB, AK, 15 Jul 1991-1 Jul 1994
Nellis AFB, NV, 29 Jul 1995

DEPLOYED STATIONS
Camp Laguana, AZ, 27 Jun-Jul 1943
Bowling Green Aprt, KY, 9 Dec 1943-24 Mar 1944

ASSIGNMENTS
Air Force Combat Command, 2 Mar 1942
Army Air Forces, 9 Mar 1942
74th Observation (later, 74th Reconnaissance; 74th Tactical Reconnaissance) Group, 21 Mar 1942
XIX Tactical Air Command, 7 Nov 1945
First Air Force, 27 Feb 1946
Tactical Air Command, 21 Mar 1946
67th Reconnaissance Group, 28- 31 Mar 1946
67th Reconnaissance (later, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance) Group, 19 May 1947-28 Mar 1949
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, 18 Sep 1953
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 1 Oct 1957-8 Mar 1960
Tactical Air Command, 3 Nov 1965
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 1 Apr 1966
432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 25 Oct 1966
Tactical Air Command, 10 Nov 1970-24 Jan 1971
355th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 Jul 1971
432nd Tactical Drone Group, 1 Jul 1976- 1 Apr 1979
Eleventh Air Force, 15 Jul 1991

11th Operations Group, 27 Jan 1992-1 Jul 1994
57th Operations Group, 29 Jul 1995

ATTACHMENTS
69th Reconnaissance Group, Nov 1945-26 Feb 1946
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 1 Jun-30 Nov 1954 and 1 Jul-30 Sep 1957

WEAPON SYSTEMS
O-52
L-4
P-43
P-39, 1943
P-40, 1943-1944
B-25/F-10, 1944-1945
L-5, 1944-1945
P-51/F-6, 1945-1946
A-26, 1945-1946
FA(later, RB)-26, 1947-1949
RB/WB-26, 1953-1957
SC-47, 1957
RB/WB-66, 1957-1960
T-33, 1957-1960
RF-4C, 1967-1970
DC/RC-130, 1971
DC-130A
DC-130E
AQM-34, 1971-1979
CH-3, 1972- 1979
BGM-34, 1974-1975

ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBERS
DC-130A
57-0497
61-2371

DC-130E
61-2362

ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT TAIL/BASE CODES
DC-130A: DM

RF-4C
KV; Mountain Home, AFB, ID
JO; Shaw AFB, SC
OO; Udorn RTAFB, Thailand

UNIT COLORS
Black

COMMANDERS
LTC H. C. Lancaster, #1954
LTC John Breeden, 2005

HONORS
Service Streamers
World War II
American Theater
Korean Theater

Campaign Streamers
Vietnam
Vietnam Air Offensive
Vietnam Air Offensive, Phase II
Vietnam Air/Ground
Vietnam Air Offensive, Phase III
Vietnam Air Offensive, Phase IV
Tet/69 Counteroffensive
Vietnam Summer/Fall 1969
Vietnam Winter/Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Southwest Monsoon

Armed Forces Expeditionary Streamers
None

Decorations
Presidential Unit Citations
[25 Oct] 1966-31 Mar 1967
19 Sep 1967-1 Nov 1968
1 Nov 1968-31 Oct 1969

Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards with Combat "V" Device
[25 Oct] 1966-18 Sep 1967
21 Nov 1969-10 Nov 1970

Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards
1 Jul 1957-1 Nov 1958
1 Jul 1971-1 Jun 1973
1 Jul 1992-30 Jun 1994

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
[25 Oct] 1966-10 Nov 1970

EMBLEM
On a disc per bend Ultramarine Blue and Light Blue an owl White trimmed Brown in flight, beak and feet Yellow, above which is an award star, being a Red disc within a White annulet on a Yellow winged star, the whole within Red and White concentric borders. (Approved, 20 Jul 1966; replaced emblems approved, 28 Dec 1953, and, 26 Oct 1942)

EMBLEM SIGNIFICANCE

MOTTO

NICKNAME

OPERATIONS
The 11th Reconnaissance Squadron is currently in operation at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nev., and is the first of the Air Forces RQ-1A/A Predator squadrons unmanned aerial vehicles or UAV squadrons. It provides theater commanders with deployable long endurance real time reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. The squadron operates medium and high altitude multi-sensor platform to locate, identify and report battlefield conditions to warfighters. In addition the 11th RS collects, exploits and distributes intelligence products to theater commanders and national level leadership and conducts all Predator aircrew qualification training.

Maneuvers and demonstrations for the training of ground forces, 1942-1945.

Following its activation in March, 1942, the 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron engaged in reconnaissance, mapping artillery adjustment, bombing and strafing missions throughout the United States in support of Army Training during World War II.

A little over a year later, it was activated again, this time at March Air Force Base, CA. Squadron members flew RB-26s. The squadron flew primarily photographic reconnaissance training missions in the Southwest United States until its Inactivation in March 1949.

The White Owl Squadron was activated on 18 September 1953. It was composed of the personnel of the deactivated 6166th Air Weather Reconnaissance Flight and the ECM Section of the 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. The squadron has a two-fold mission. The ECM Section furnishes the U. N. air and ground forces with up to date electronic reconnaissance of enemy and friendly radar activities, as well as coordinating with our own radar sites for training purposes.

Our weather flights flying out over the Yellow sea, supply the U.N. forces with the latest in weather information as well as observing and reporting all shipping activities encountered during its many flights.

The squadron was transitioned to jet aircraft in 1957, when WB-26 and RB-26s were replaced

with RB-66s.

PACAF in 1957 received 12 RB-66C electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft, which it assigned to the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing's 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan. To various extents and regardless of location, the delivered RB-66Cs were to participate in the Little Barney and other modification programs, still to be applied to the preceding RB-66Bs and B-66Bs.

11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Electronics and Weather): Converted from RB/WB-26Cs to RB-66C/WB-66Ds beginning during August 1957, while assigned to the 67th TRW. PACAF, at Yokota AS.

In April 1966, the 11th TRS continued its reconnaissance career with RF-4Cs at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. By October, the squadron was combat-ready and was deployed to the Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. Shortly after their arrival at Udorn, the crews of the 11th began flight combat reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam and Laos. In addition to combat reconnaissance missions, the also flew daily weather reconnaissance missions over planned strike areas for 7th Air Force.

The 11th TRS experimented with laser targeting to get photographic targets at night during the spring of 1969 and began using long-range navigation in May 1970. Including its participation in Cambodia, the squadron flew 26,493 combat missions in Southeast Asia and earned 10 combat streamers before ceasing combat operations Oct. 24, 1970. A month later the squadron was inactivated.

On July 1, 1971, it became the 11th Tactical Drone Squadron flying DC-130s with AQM-34 jet-powered reconnaissance drone at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. The squadron added Ch-3s in 1972 and by 173 was using the helicopters to midair retrieve the drones.

The 11th Tactical Drone Squadron of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing successfully launched four drones in rapid sequence from a single aircraft and set three USAF records in the process.11 Oct 1973

On 11 October 1973, the wing’s 11th Tactical Drone Squadron successfully launched four drones from a single aircraft in rapid sequence. In the process, three new USAF records were established. Drone operations from Davis-Monthan achieved another historic first in 1974 when the 11th TDS conducted its first launch of a Maverick missile from a remotely piloted vehicle. The missile scored a direct hit on the designated target at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah. They also tested the Maverick-equipped BGM-34 air-to-ground attack drones in 1974 and 1975 as well as a new reconnaissance drone, the AQM-2V, in 1976. By 1978, the drone program was winding down and the squadron was inactivated in 1979.

On 23 October 2000, at 0042 Local, 2242 Zulu, an RQ-1K, S/N 94-1567, crashed near Dunavo, Kosovo, approximately 180 nautical miles southeast of Tuzla Air Base (AB), Bosnia. The Predator, assigned to the 57th Wing (57 WG), 11th Reconnaissance Squadron (11 RS), Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, was part of an Operation JOINT FORGE reconnaissance

mission over Kosovo. The aircraft was based at Tuzla AB, Bosnia. Approximately six minutes before impact, the mishap aircraft pitched nose down approximately 10 degrees. Reference airspeed of 72 nautical miles per hour (knots) was maintained in this descent due to the aircraft's airspeed hold mode engagement. The descent rate varied for the remainder of the flight, but generally exceeded 1000 feet per minute. The mishap pilot's attention was focused on helping the mishap sensor operator with target identification and he did not notice the descent until 20 seconds prior to impact. The altitude continued to decrease, except for a slight pull-up about 20 seconds prior to impact, until contact with the ground. The primary cause of the mishap, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was mechanical failure in the variable pitch propeller (VPP) control system that caused the propeller to reverse pitch. This caused a complete loss of thrust and a 300% increase in drag, resulting in loss of aircraft control. There is also substantial evidence that maintenance actions during the 28 September 2000 200-hour VPP servo assembly time change were contributing factors to the mishap. The mishap pilot's distraction during the mishap aircraft's propeller failure and subsequent descent was not determined to be causative.

On 30 March 2001, at 12:27 P.M. local time (1027 Zulu), an RQ-lL Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, serial number 96-302S, crashed one nautical mile north of the town of Brani-Do in Bosnia. The Predator, assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, was supporting the Kosovo Stabilization Force. The mishap pilot and the mishap sensor operator, both from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, were remotely flying the aircraft from Tuzla Air Base. There were no injuries, fatalities, or significant property damage due to this mishap. Shortly before the impact, the mishap aircraft pitched down and accelerated to 170 knots, due to pitot static system icing. When the mishap pilot recognized an icing problem, he failed to execute critical steps for pitot icing, namely to tum off the preprogram mode and the airspeed hold in sequence. Instead, he activated pitot heat to clear the ice blockage. As a result, when the ice melted, the mishap aircraft rapidly pitched up, likely causing the left wing to buckle and separate from the aircraft. The primary cause of this mishap, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was the mishap pilot's failure to immediately execute critical checklist steps for pitot static icing. There is also substantial evidence that nonuse of the pitot static heating system was a substantially contributing factor in this mishap.

On 25 January 2002, at 1308 local time, an RQ-1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, S/N 96-3022, crashed while landing at a classified forward operating location within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The Predator, permanently assigned to the 57th Wing (57 WG), 1 Ith Reconnaissance Squadron (11 RS), Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, was returning early from an Operation ENDURING FREEDOM reconnaissance mission over Afghanistan due to fluctuating oil pressure indications. The aircraft was destroyed beyond repair upon impact. There were no reported injuries or fatalities from this accident. The mishap pilot's first attempted landing resulted in a go-around due to the cffccts of gusty winds. During the second approach under similar wind conditions, in the flare the mishap aircraft's nose ballooned. The mishap pilot attempted to push the nose forward to correct this condition. Before the mishap pilot had the opportunity to initiate go-around procedures again, the mishap aircraft's nose pitched forward beyond his control. The nose gear struck the runway with excessive force, breaking the nose landing gear strut. As an additional result of the excessively hard landing, the aircraft's right tailplane separated from the fuselage. The resulting asymmetrical pitch and yaw caused the

aircraft to bank sharply to the right. It impacted the ground approximately 100 yards cast of the runway. The primary cause of the mishap was the pilot's inability to maintain positive control of the aircraft's pitch due to the adverse effects of strong wind gusts. The resulting structural damage from a nose gear-first landing further inhibited control of the aircraft, which then impacted the ground. Gust wind speeds reported by the air traffic control tower just prior to the mishap were at the maximum limit for RQ-1B landings. Gust speeds reported five minutes after the mishap were out of limits.

On 17 September 2002, at approximately 1142 (Zulu), a Predator aircraft, S/N 96-3024, crashed in Southwest Asia. The Predator, assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 57th Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada, was performing a reconnaissance mission in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDON. The aircraft was remotely piloted and there were no fatalities or property damage. Personnel recovering the wreckage reported a building near the crash site with no apparent damage from the incident. Shortly before impact, the aircraft entered an area of meteorological convective activity. The satellite data link with the aircraft was lost for approximately 20 seconds. The link was then reestablished for nearly a minute, but by this point, the aircraft was unresponsive to pilot commands. The data link was lost a second time, reestablished momentarily, and then permanently lost. The primary cause of the mishap was the aircraft being unintentionally flown into a hazardous cloud.

On 25 October 2002, at 08:40 local Pacific Daylight Time, an RQ-1L Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, serial number 00-3065,11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, impacted the terrain approximately nine nautical miles west of Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field, Nevada. Mission planning and required briefings with all crewmembers were conducted on 25 October 2002. Aircraft preparations, preflight and engine start were uneventful. The training mission was designed to include traffic pattern operations, instructor pilot upgrade training, and Predator B-Model difference training, including area work in range airspace. While attempting to descend to 6,500 feet above mean sea level from 10,000 feet — preparing for an entry into the Indian Springs traffic pattern — the aircraft descended to 5,236 feet in the vicinity of mountainous terrain, causing the crew to experience line-of-sight datalink problems between the ground control station and the aircraft. The crew had flown the aircraft into a position where high terrain was obstructing the datalink signal. Following attempts to regain the datalink through manipulation of the aircraft and ground station antennas, the mishap pilot eventually executed emergency procedures to manually sever the datalink between the ground control station and the aircraft, forcing the aircraft to initiate preset maneuvers designed to safeguard the aircraft during lost datalink situations. The aircraft impacted the mountainous terrain 16 seconds after the emergency procedures were initiated. There were no injuries or fatalities from the accident. Upon impact, the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. The loss is valued at $3,300,000. There are no claims for damage to government or private property. There was minimal media interest regarding this accident. The primary cause of this accident, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was inattention to altitude on the part of the crew. Significant contributing factors, supported by substantial evidence, were the crew's loss of situational awareness -- including fixation on landing gear checklist procedures, distraction with antenna and transmitter configuration management, and incorrect analysis of lost downlink video -- and the untimely application of emergency action procedures for "Total Downlink Failure Below 2,000 Feet AGL."

On 14 June 2004 at 1440 local time, an MQ-1L PREDATOR, S/N 99-3054, callsign DEADLY 01, 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada crashed while operating in the Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field, Nevada traffic pattern on a student training mission. The aircraft was severely damaged upon impact, with the loss valued at $4,200,400. No one was injured in the accident, and there was no damage to government or private property. Media interest was minimal. Despite an almost, constant idle power setting from the final approach fix to the flare on a non-precision approach, the aircraft remained above glide path, up to 15 knots fast, and with momentary descent rates greater 1200 feet per minute (fpixs). At approximately 130 feet above the ground, the descent rate increased to 809 fpm. During the last 13 seconds prior to executing a go around, the aircraft slowed from 10 knots above approach speed to 10 knots below approach speed. The student pilot initiated a go-around, The aircraft pitch rotated from near level to 8 degrees nose up as airspeed decreased to 14 knots below approach speed. The aircraft impacted the runway tail planes first, porpoised and bounced into the air twice before coming to a stop. There is clear and convincing evidence that this mishap was caused by a late executed go around from a poorly flown approach. The crew allowed the aircraft to get slow on short final under gusty and variable wind conditions which led to a high sink rate. The student initiated the go around concurrently with the instructor pilot and supervisor of flying directing “go around”, but. not in time to prevent the tail of the aircraft contacting the .runway and cable barrier at a high sink rate due to a steeper than nominal approach path and a lower than normal power setting (idle) coming into the landing flare. There is clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft hit tail, first due to the student pilot setting too high of a nose pitch for the go around. There is clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft tail planes sustained major damage aggravated by cable barrier contact upon runway impact. There is substantial evidence that wind conditions, operational risk management processes, human factors issues, and barrier placement vice aimpoint significantly contributed to the mishap.

On 22 September 2004, at approximately 1213 Local Pacific Daylight Savings Time, an MQ-1L Predator, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), serial number 01-003079, 11th Reconnaissance Squadron. 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, experienced a hard landing and subsequently departed Runway 26 at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Airfield while conducting a training mission supporting student sensor operator (SSO) qualification. There were no injuries or fatalities from the accident. Upon impact, the mishap RPA (MRPA) was damaged beyond field level repair. Other than the damage to the aircraft, valued at $2,883,977, there was no significant, damage to government or private property. The MRPA had been inspected prior to takeoff and had been flying for approximately 3 hours and 12 minutes when the mishap pilot (MP) began an approach to a touch-and-go landing. A touch-and-go landing occurs when an aircraft briefly touches the runway then immediately takes off without stopping. The MP arrested the descent of the MRPA (flared) approximately 15 feet above the runway. The MRPA’s airspeed decreased below that required to control the aircraft, and the MRPA rapidly dropped to the runway. The MRPA landed hard, and the MP began to execute a go-around; however, the MRPA bounced again before the third and final runway impact. The impact sequence damaged landing gear and flight control components. The MRPA then slid straight for approximately 1,000 feet before veering left. The MRPA continued to skid off the prepared surface, and the MP discontinued the go-around attempt. The MRPA came to rest 52 feet from the edge of the runway, 4,340 feet from the approach threshold. The primary cause of this accident, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was the failure of the MP to correct a high flare in time to

prevent a hard landing. The hard landing and subsequent bounces resulted in failure of the landing gear and flight control components from which the MP was unable to recover. The MP continued a go-around attempt after the MRPA became unflvable, resulting in runway departure. Five significant factors, supported by substantial evidence, contributed to this accident: (!) the MP failed to correct an unstable short final approach that exceeded published command criteria for a go-around; (2) the mishap SSO and mishap instructor sensor operator failed to provide corrective calls for excessive airspeed and vertical speed deviations; (3) a decreasing performance wind shear caused the MRPA to lose 7 knots of airspeed late in the flare; (4) the MP failed to reduce aircraft power to prevent departing the runway; and (5) the Predator's lack of sensory cues contributed to the MP's decision to continue a go-around attempt after the MRPA had become unflyable.

On 22 June 2006, at 1336 hours local time, a MQ-1L Predator, S/N 03-3109, crashed at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. The mishap aircraft (MA) was assigned to the 757th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and flown by the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 57th Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. The wreckage was recovered at the impact site. There were no injuries or fatalities from the accident. Upon impact, the MA was damaged beyond economical repair. Other than the loss of the aircraft, valued at $4,700,000, there was no damage to government or private property. Approximately five minutes after takeoff during a training mission, the MA's engine experienced a rapid loss of engine oil followed by an engine failure. This sudden loss of engine power coupled with the aircraft's low altitude prohibited the safe recovery of the MA. To ensure the safety of ground personnel, the mishap pilot (MP) elected to impact the MA into a high terrain area near the runway. The primary cause of this accident, supported by clear and convincing evidence, was the rapid loss of oil in the engine oil system due to a loose oil filter. The oil filter was installed on 7 June 2006 during a 60-hour engine inspection. The sudden loss of oil from the loose oil filter led to engine power loss and combined with the aircraft's low altitude, prohibited the safe recovery of the MA. The Board could not determine the precise cause for the loose oil filter. Technical order guidance requires the oil filter's seal to be lubricated with oil and then installed "hands tight". It is most likely that the aircraft's oil filter was not installed in accordance with this technical guidance. A contributing factor to this mishap, supported by substantial evidence is the lack of mechanical markings or locking mechanisms on the oil filter location itself to ensure proper installation. While the current installation of the MA's oil filter is a straight forward procedure, given the catastrophic consequences of an improperly installed filter, an oil filter should have been designed that locks in-place or has visible marks to ensure proper installation.

On 3 August 2006 at 1411 hours local time, during a training mission, aircraft MQ-IB Predator, S/N 99-3055, crashed short of a ran way at Creech AFB, NV. The mishap aircraft (MA) was assigned to the 1lth Reconnaissance Squadron, Creech AFB, N V. The purpose of the flight for the mishap crew (MC) was to develop basic aircraft flying proficiency with emphasis on traffic patterns and landings for a student sensor operator (SO) enrolled in the Launch and Recovery Course (LRC), Aircraft damage was estimated at $ 1,435,765, No one was injured in the accident. Other than the damage to the aircraft, there was no damage to government or private property. After practicing a simulated flame-out (SFQ) approach (an approach used by pilots to place the aircraft in a position to safely land on the runway fallowing a simulated loss of engine thrust or power), the mishap instructor pilot (MIP) flew runway heading to 500 feet above ground Level (AGL). He then initiated a left tom to the north. At that time, the MIP inadvertently

depressed the engine ignition kill switch instead of retracting the landing gear. The MIP turned his head away from, the confirmatory message on the heads-up display (HUD) while talking to someone else in the Ground Control Station. While looking away from the HUD, the MIP squeezed a trigger that confirmed his earlier inadvertent command to kill the engine. With the engine shut off, the MIP immediately realized that he had inadvertently depressed the incorrect switch and that the MA had insufficient altitude to reach a runway. However, instead of trying to restart the engine, the MIP unsuccessfully attempted to glide the aircraft back to the runway. The MA crashed slightly off the runway and was severely damaged upon impact. There is clear and convincing evidence that this mishap was caused by pilot error when the pilot inadvertently shut off the engine as he tried to raise the landing gear. A contributing factor to this mishap, supported by-substantial evidence, was the pilot's lack of airmanship in not attempting an engine restart.

Propeller Failure Cited as Cause in Predator Crash An MQ-1B Predator crashed May 13 2013 about 13 miles from Creech AFB, Nev., due to a malfunction in the propeller system and the ground crew's misinterpretation of instrument readings, according to a newly released Air Combat Command Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board report. The Predator was participating in a training mission with four separate ground crews from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron at the time of the crash. The AIB president found "clear and convincing evidence" the cause of the mishap was a variable pitch propeller system failure. "A cable that provides electrical current to the system's servomotor was found to have produced inconsistent electrical current," states a Nov. 13 ACC summary of the report. "This lack of electrical power eventually put the aircraft into a thrust deficient situation from which it could not recover." In addition, aircrews failed to notice the propeller pitch angel remained static over time, checking instead to see if the angle fell within a normal range, states the summary. This contributed to the crews incorrectly assuming the propeller pitch was functioning properly. The MQ-1 and one M-36 training missile were destroyed upon impact-a loss of approximately $4.5 million.]

Lt. Col. John Breeden accepts command of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron from Col. Mark Morris, 57th Operations Group commander, during a ceremony at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nev., Dec. 17. Colonel Breeden is the first Air Force Reservist to command a permanent, active-duty operational unit. 2005

The 11th RS trains pilots and sensor operators for the RQ/MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle program. reservist made Air Force history Dec. 17 when he became commander of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field, Nev. Lt. Col. John Breeden is the first Air Force Reserve officer to command a permanent, active-duty operational unit, according to Air Force Reserve Command officials. He replaced Lt. Col. Michael Keaton. The change of command reinforces the Future Total Force initiative announced by Air Force leaders in December. Colonel Breeden’s command of the 11th RS is one step in implementing this initiative. “This is a process that’s taken place over a few years,” said Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, AFRC commander, after the change of command ceremony. “The air reserve components are involved in every aspect of the Air Force mission. This is just another step in that evolution.” The 11th RS trains pilots and sensor operators for the RQ/MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle program. “Our Predator crews employ lethal firepower to protect and

defend our forces on the ground" as part of the global war on terrorism, said Col. Mark Morris, 57th Operations Group commander. "Some of the graduates (of the 11th RS) fly combat missions over Iraq within 48 hours of graduating." Many Predator missions that take place over Iraq and Afghanistan are flown from Nellis. Colonel Breeden being named commander of the 11th RS is an example of the Air Force's resolve to more closely integrate active-duty and Reserve forces, Colonel Morris said. "When I took over the operations group 19 months ago, I was told I was getting a full-time Reservist," Colonel Morris said. "I was quickly impressed with (Colonel Breeden) and wanted to put him on the squadron commander list." Colonel Breeden served as an A-10 pilot before separating from the active force. After Sept. 11, 2001, he went back into the Air Force as a full-time Reservist. "I didn't seek out this job," the colonel said, "but I sought to serve my country." In his efforts to serve, he has set the example for Future Total Force integration. "What we're trying to do here is integrate the Air National Guard and Reserve to put the best people in the best positions to move forward the future of the Air Force," Colonel Breeden said. The ramifications of the change of command will be felt beyond the gates of Indian Springs. "I think we'll see more integration in the future," General Bradley said. Integrating the active force and the Reserve benefits the Air Force and its Airmen. "Most of the air reserve component Airmen have spent years in the Air Force and then entered the Reserve or Air National Guard," General Bradley said. "We don't want to lose all those great people and their talents." Maintaining the experience of the Guard and Reserve members is a large benefit of the FTF initiative, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wood, Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs. "The organizational concepts (of the FTF) will allow us to maximize the combat capability of our equipment and balance experience levels of our people, improving their training and effectiveness," said General Wood during a press conference about the new initiative Dec. 1. "Furthermore, they will allow us to capitalize on the rich experience of our reserve components and the quick deployability of the active duty in both emerging and enduring missions." 2005

421215	L-2A	42-15118	11OS	71OG	Salinas, CA	GAC	(parked aircraft)	Observation Airdrome, Salinas, CA
420517	L-4A	42-36490	11OS	74OG	DeRidder Field, DeRidder, LA	MACO	Phillips, Robert E.	South of DeRidder, LA
420816	L-1A	41-18987	11OS	74OG	DeRidder Field, DeRidder, LA	LAC	Cook, Phillip G	Deridder AAB, LA
421016	O-52	40-2760	11OS	74OG	DeRidder AAB, LA	LAC	Anderson, Quentin G	DeRidder AAB, LA
421120	L-4A	42-15255	11OS	74OG	DeRidder AAB, DeRidder, LA	LACNU	Anderson, Quentin G	Deridder AAB, LA

440107	P-40N	42-106045	11TRS	74TRG	Bowling Green, KY	LAC	Williams, James F.	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY
440224	P-40N	43-5438	11TRS	74TRG	Bowling Green, KY	TAC	Davis, Glenn E	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY
440226	P-40N	42-106096	11TRS	74TRG	Campbell Field, KY	LAC	Ward, Raymond P	Scott Field, Belleville, IL
440307	P-40R	42-10864	11TRS	74TRG	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY	LACGC	Lynch, Hoan SF	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY
440307	P-40N	42-105657	11TRS	74TRG	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY	LACGC	Pontiff, Harvey J	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY
440513	P-40R	42-10874	11TRS	74TRG	Pounds AAF, Tyler, Tx	LACMF	Quinlan, Harold E	Redman AAF, OR
440530	P-40R	42-10648	11TRS	74TRG	Pounds Field, Tyler, TX	KTOAEF	Locke, Emmet C	Pounds Field, Tyler, TX
440710	L-5	42-98343	11TRS	74TRG	Tyler AAF, Tyler, TX	FLEF	Phillip, Walter J	5 mi W of Bronson, TX
441216	F-10	41-29885	11TRS	74TRG	Lafayette AAF, LA	KCRMF	Vanciel, Melvin L	12M W Starkville, MS
450610	TB-25J	43-28050	11TRS	74TRG	Stuttgart AAF, AR	CBLMF	Hill, Revoe S	6M N Rosedale, MS
450807	F-6D	45-11668	11TRS	74TRG	Stuttgart AAF, AR	KCR	Ditkens, Gordon R	13M NW Stuttgart, AR
450808	P-51D	44-74748	11TRS	74TRG	Stuttgart AAF, AR	LAC	Ray, Edgar J	Perrin Field, TX
451226	F-6K-10NT	44-11995	11TRS	69TRG	Brooks Fld	GAC	Hoza, Paul P	Stuttgart AAF
460118	AT-6F	44-82498	11TRS	69TRG	Brooks Fld	GL	Keating, James C	Brooks Fld
440107	P-40N	42-106045	11TRS	74TRG	Bowling Green, KY	LAC	Williams, James F.	Mun Arpt, Bowling Green, KY

471029	AT-6F	44-81858	11RS	67RG	March Field, CA	TAC	Maki, George A	March Field, CA

430303	P-43B	40-2895	11 Obsn	74 Obsn	Desert Center, CA	LACGL	Anderson, Quentin G	Army Aux Flying Field 4, AZ
430304	L-2A	42-15125	11 Obsn	74 Obsn	Desert Center, CA	KSSP	Hawes, Verne J	16 Mi S Needles, CA
430327	P-39F	41-7299	11 Obsn	74 Obsn	Desert Center, CA	KBOSSP	Soverel, Ralph W Jr	1 Mi S Desert Center, CA

430501	O-52	40-2853	11 Recon	74 Recon	AAB, Desert Center, CA	TACGL	Wilde, Carroll L (crew chief)	AAB, Desert Center, CA
430512	L-6	43-2581	11 Recon	74 Recon	Desert Center, CA	FLEF	Hughes, Carl W	6 Mi W Indio, CA
430515	L-6	43-2607	11 Recon	74 Recon	AAB, Desert Center, CA	TOA	Finley, Issac	Ibis Landing Strip, CA
430525	O-52	40-2880	11 Recon	74 Recon	Desert Center, CA	LAC	Good, Clark W	1 Mi W Camp Clipper, CA
430611	P-39N	42-18931	11 Recon	74 Recon	AAB Desert Center, CA	KCRGC	Chandler, Arthur B	15 Mi SW AAB, Desert Center, CA
430614	P-39D	41-38301	11 Recon	74 Recon	AAB, Desert Center, CA	LACMF	Williams, James F	AAB, Desert Center, CA
430710	P-39N	42-18919	11 Recon	74 Recon	AAB, Desert Center, CA	FLEF	Nicodemus, Ralph J	3 Mi SE Vidal, CA
430807	P-39L	42-4457	11 Recon	74 Recon	Desert Center, CA	LAC	Dale, Gordon E	Kern Co Arpt, Bakersfield, CA
430828	P-39D	40-3025	11 Recon	74 Recon	Desert Center, CA	BLoG	Dale, Gordon E	Wendover Field, UT
430902	O-52	40-2759	11 Tac Recon	74 Tac Recon	AAB, Desert Center, CA	KCRGC	Carrol, John D	18 Mi E Hyder, AZ
430904	O-52	40-2865	11 Tac Recon	74 Tac Recon	AAF, Desert Center, CA	LACGL	Alexander, Robert S	AAF, Palm Springs, CA
430914	P-39L	42-4457	11 Tac Recon	74 Tac Recon	Desert Center AB, CA	BLMF	Davis, Glenn E	Desert Center AB


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